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Abstract: This article argues that an increase of the retirement age from 65 years to 67 or 
higher, which is the most unpopular pension reform measure, is politically feasible if the 
major parties build either a formal or an informal grand coalition. It argues further that 
institutional rules and agreed standards, especially the goals expressed in relation to 
pension policy, facilitate the formation of a grand coalition and increase the autonomy of 
governments vis-à-vis trade unions. Specifically, by restricting key policy instruments for 
responding to fiscal pressures, they lead political parties to consider the controversial 
option of raising the retirement age and to engage in a coordinative discourse about the 
necessity of this change and the limits of other reform options. This argument implies 
that the success of a retirement age reform does not depend on a negotiated agreement 
between a government and trade unions. By examining the agenda-setting and decision-
making processes in Germany from the mid-1990s to 2007, this article shows that 
governments raise the retirement age only if they face constraints that rule out tax 
increases and benefit cuts and that they are able to enact even comprehensive retirement 
age reforms that increase not only the normal age but also the earliest eligibility age for 
both public and private pensions. 
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Résumé: Cet article tente de démontrer qu'une hausse de  l'âge de la retraite de 65 à 67 
ans ou plus,  une des politiques de réforme du régime des retraites les moins populaires, 
est politiquement réalisable si les principaux partis forment une grande coalition, qu'elle 
soit formelle ou informelle. Il souligne que les règles institutionnelles et les normes en 
place, particulièrement par apport à la finalité des politiques relatives au pension, 
facilitent la formation d'une grande coalition et renforcent l'autonomie des 
gouvernements  vis-à-vis des syndicats. Plus précisément, en restreignant certaines 
politiques instrumentales clés afin de répondre aux pressions fiscales, elles permettent 
aux partis politiques de considérer l'option controversée, à savoir l’augmentation de l'âge 
de la retraite, et de  s'engager dans un discours de coordination à propos de la nécessité de 
ce changement et des limitations des réformes alternatives envisageables. Cet 
argumentaire implique que le succès d'une réforme de l'âge de la retraire ne dépend pas 
de la concertation entre le gouvernement et les syndicats. En examinant le processus de 
prise de décision et l'agenda fixé par l'Allemagne entre le milieu des années 1990 et 2007, 
cet article démontre que les gouvernements augmentent l'âge de la retraite seulement 
lorsqu’ils sont dans un environnement qui prévient l'augmentation des taxes et la baisse 
des allocations. Ils peuvent ainsi mettre en place des réformes encore plus profondes, non 
seulement par apport à l'âge normal de retraite, mais aussi par rapport à l'âge minimum 
d'éligibilité qu'il s'agisse des régimes de retraite des secteurs public et privé.      2
Introduction 
 
A striking feature of pension reforms in the advanced industrialized countries is 
their scant use of the most effective solution to the problems of pension expenditure 
growth and income insecurity in old age: the increase of the retirement age to more than 
65 years. If workers retired only one year later, pension expenditure could be reduced by 
close to 1 percent of GDP, and pension benefits could be maintained at their existing 
levels (European Commission and European Council 2006, 7). The European Union has 
found that a significant increase of the retirement age would solve the fiscal challenge of 
population aging: “… by raising the effective age by five years …. without any additional 
accrual of pension rights, public pension expenditure could be kept, by and large, at its 
current level” (European Commission and European Council 2006, 55). Without policy 
reforms, public spending on pensions is expected to grow by 3 or 4 percent of GDP over 
the coming decades (OECD 2001, 153). 
 
At the international level, the policy option of raising the retirement age has 
become the new focus of the pension reform agenda. The European Union recently 
defined an increase of the actual retirement age by five years as its medium-term goal 
(European Council 2002, 12), and the OECD recommended that governments introduce 
comprehensive reforms that promote longer employment (OECD 2006). But at the 
national level, benefit cuts have remained the rule, and increases of the retirement age the 
exception. In 2006, the European Commission complained that only a few member states 
were committed to the “Barcelona target” of increasing the retirement age by five years   3
and that even the committed countries had not proposed policies to achieve this target 
(European Commission and European Council 2006, 50). To date, only three advanced 
industrialized countries—the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom—have 
made the decision to raise the statutory retirement age from 65 to either 67 or 68 years.  
 
Governments neglect the retirement age option despite its impressive 
effectiveness in solving major policy problems because they face strong opposition from 
voters, parties, and trade unions. To guarantee the financing of public pension systems, 
the majority of European citizens prefer either higher contributions or lower benefits to a 
higher retirement age (European Commission 2004, 62-63). Less than a fifth would 
accept to work longer (European Commission 2005, 54-55). In the United Kingdom, the 
main conclusion from a public opinion study about retirement age policies was that “any 
government that raised the state pension age would be punished for it, by people from all 
social backgrounds” (Robinson et al. 2005, 25). In order to reduce blame from voters, the 
three countries that decided to increase the formal retirement age used long transition 
periods and delayed the start of this period by many years. While long transition periods 
weaken the electoral constraints, they also weaken the fiscal effects of retirement age 
increases in the long term and, most importantly, preclude short- and medium-term 
spending reductions. By studying the factors that lead to an increase of the retirement 
age, this article seeks to close a gap in the literature on pension reform politics which has 
thus far focused on analyzing the opportunities and constraints for benefit cuts and partial 
privatization (Bonoli 2000; Immergut et al. 2007; Myles and Pierson 2001; Weaver 
2004). Specifically, this article examines two key questions: first, which conditions lead   4
governments to consider seriously this option despite its electoral risks? Second, how do 
governments overcome the political obstacles to legislating an increase of the retirement 
age, especially the likely opposition from competing parties and trade unions? 
 
This article suggests that both institutional constraints and the paradigms that 
shape pension policy are important factors in the agenda-setting and decision-making 
processes that lead to the successful adoption of unpopular retirement age reforms. It 
develops two arguments about the politics of raising the retirement age. The first is that 
governments consider an increase of the retirement age if institutional and ideational 
constraints rule out two key options: higher contributions and lower benefits. Since the 
number of options for reforming public pensions is limited, the combined effect of 
institutional and ideational factors can severely restrict governments’ choices; if 
contribution increases and benefit cuts are not permitted, raising the age of retirement is 
the last resort in making public pension systems fiscally sustainable. The second 
argument is that institutional and ideational constraints increase the chances of successful 
reform because they facilitate the building of coalitions among political parties and 
enhance the political autonomy of governments vis-à-vis trade unions. Thus, they affect 
not only the governmental agenda, but also the decision-making process. This argument 
implies that retirement age reforms are adopted successfully if the main parties that 
compete for office are able either to form a grand coalition or to cooperate informally 
with each other; a social pact, a negotiated agreement between the government and the 
trade unions, is not necessary for raising the retirement age.   5
This article examines in three parts why the grand coalition government in 
Germany, in 2007, was able to pass legislation for raising the retirement from 65 to 67 
years. The first part outlines a framework for explaining retirement age increases. The 
second part explains why German governments considered the option of raising the 
retirement age from 65 to 67 years, and the third part explains why the Christian 
Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD) were able to build a 
grand coalition for a higher retirement age and to pass reform legislation without 
negotiating a settlement with the trade unions. In order to examine the factors that 
produced these outcomes, this article uses information from interviews with policy-
makers, civil servants, interest group officials, and experts, and from documents such as 
policy papers, election manifestos, public speeches, and news reports. 
 
 
Explaining Retirement Age Increases 
 
Retirement age increases can be explained by the formation of either a formal or 
an informal grand coalition for a higher retirement age. The emergence of a grand 
coalition depends on four key factors (see figure 1): (1) the institutional constraints for 
pension reforms, (2) the contraints created by the dominant pension policy paradigm, and 
(3) the design features of a country’s public pension program which restrict the policy 
instruments that could be used as an alternative to a retirement age increase; the effects of 
these factors and (4) the preferences of the major political parties, both regarding the 
settings of the ideationally constrained instruments and regarding the available   6
instruments, either facilitate or counteract the formation of a grand coalition for a higher 
retirement age. 
 
Figure 1: A Model for Explaining Retirement Age Increases 
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Since raising the retirement age is among citizens the most unpopular option for 
pension reform, governments consider the legislation of an increase only as a last resort. 
The two most important sources of constraints are institutions and ideas. Institutional 
rules determine which options for reform are either available or restricted (Scharpf 1998). 
For example, the EU’s deficit rule, which limits public budget deficits to 3 percent of 
GDP, restricts the ability of national governments to cover deficits in contribution-
financed pension systems with transfers from general revenue. Sets of ideas, such as 
policy paradigms, also constrain the options of governments (Hall 1993). An example is 
the principle of a stable pension contribution rate in the United States: even though it is 
not an institutional rule, it structures the pension policy-making process by ruling out 
contribution increases as an option for paying for the costs of population aging (Weaver   7
2004, 71). Even though paradigms define the policy goals and restrict the policy 
instruments, they still allow for choices about the settings of the constrained instruments. 
For example, even if the dominant policy paradigm prescribes a stable contribution rate, 
governments could still set the level of the contribution rate. 
 
Institutional and ideational constraints have a strong effect on governments’ 
choices because public pension programs have only a limited number of parameters. The 
policy instruments for responding to the challenge of population aging could be classified 
within the following four types: (1) tax increases, (2) benefit cuts, (3) changes of 
eligibility conditions, and (4) use of reserves. Within each type, the number of 
theoretically possible instruments depends on the design of the public pension program, 
which varies significantly across the OECD countries (OECD 2007). For example, the 
closing of early retirement pathways could lead to significant reductions in pension 
spending only in countries which have multiple public exit options. Institutional rules and 
ideational prescriptions limit the available reform options, but they do not completely 
determine the instruments that governments consider. Even if there are many constraints 
on changing taxes and benefits, raising the retirement age is rarely the only available 
option for changing eligibility conditions. Governments have the option of closing early 
retirement pathways and of changing the incentives to retire, for example by increasing 
financial penalties for early retirement or creating possibilities and incentives for longer 
employment. Most governments in OECD countries prefer these options to raising the 
normal retirement age (OECD 2006, 11). 
   8
Governments that have decided to pass unpopular welfare state reforms face three 
obstacles in the political decision-making process: (1) opposition from voters, (2) 
resistance from trade unions, and (3) institutional path dependence (Weaver 2004; 
Pierson 1996; Myles and Pierson 2001; Ebbinghaus 2006). Electoral opposition is the 
main obstacle in the politics of raising the retirement age. A significant increase of the 
long-established retirement age of 65 years is a highly visible change, which voters tend 
to perceive both as a restriction of choice and as a benefit cut. But unlike pension benefit 
cuts, which can be masked by altered indexation formulas (Weaver 2003, Table 2.1), a 
retirement age increase cannot be easily disguised. Only a grand coalition or informal 
cooperation—which are the most effective, yet rarely available, blame-avoiding 
strategies—enable governments to overcome electoral constraints (Myles and Pierson 
2001; Hering 2008). Since trade unions are extremely reluctant to serve as signatories of 
an age increase, the politics of retirement differs from the normal politics of pension, 
which has been “backed by either the active or passive consent of organized labour” 
(Myles and Pierson 2001, 326). Trade unions fundamentally oppose a retirement age 
increase because their members, especially the prime-aged and older workers, do not 
accept it (Ebbinghaus 2006, 34-43; European Commission 2004, Chart 46). If trade 
unions supported a retirement age increase, they would likely suffer from a loss of 
members. Path dependence is less important in retirement age politics than in pension 
privatization: even though processes of path dependence exist in early retirement 
(Ebbinghaus 2006, 250-277), the institutional problems in the transition from 65 years to 
67 years are small compared to the double payment problem which severly constrains the 
transition from a public, pay-as-you-go system to a private, funded one (Myles and   9
Pierson 2001, 312-315). An increase in the retirement age does not necessarily impose a 
double burden on younger generations; it prevents rising life expectancy from leading to 
a further rise in the number of years spent in retirement. 
 
Institutional and ideational constraints facilitate the building of a grand coalition 
for a higher retirement age and increase the governments’ autonomy vis-à-vis the trade 
unions. If they rule out tax increases and benefit cuts, but do not constrain changes of 
eligibility conditions, the main competitors for office are likely to reconsider their 
preferences regarding the remaining options and engage in a “coordinative discourse” 
(Schmidt 2002, 209-256) about the necessity of raising the retirement age. In addition, if 
they rule out the options that trade unions find acceptable, governments are able to avoid 
negotiations with organized labor. Like institutional rules, policy paradigms can thus 




The Shift to Retirement Age Increases 
 
The new German pension reform agenda is very different from that of the 1990s. 
From the mid-1990s to 2004, both CDU/CSU and SPD-led governments primarily 
considered changes to taxes and benefits (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008, 53, 60-61; 
Bundesregierung 2004, 25); changes to eligibility conditions played only a minor role 
(Ebbinghaus 2006, 208-230). Since 2004, German governments have changed the   10
hierarchy of options: the importance of changes to taxes and benefits has declined, and 
changes to eligibility conditions have emerged as the key measures in pension reform 
initiatives. The SPD-led government was the first that considered an increase of the 
normal retirement age from 65 to 67 years, and this in spite of very high electoral risks: 
close to 80 percent of German voters rejected this measure (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 
2006). In 2004, the government did not make a decision regarding an increase of the 
retirement age, but wanted to keep this option on the agenda. It included in the 
Sustainability Act of 2004 the requirement that every four years the federal government 
reviews whether or not an increase of the statutory age was necessary (Bundesregierung 
2003, 19). The proposal of raising the retirement age from 65 to 67 years had been 
developed by the government’s Council of Economic Experts and its Commission on 
Sustainability in the Social Insurance Systems, both of which were chaired by Bert 
Rürup, one of the government’s key economic and social policy advisors 
(Sachverständigenrat Wirtschaft 2001, 161-162; Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und 
Soziale Sicherung 2003, 81-96). Based on new fiscal projections, the Rürup Commission 
had argued that “in the long run there is no alternative to increasing the statutory 
retirement age from 65 to 67 years” (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale 
Sicherung 2003, 82) and that the restriction of early retirement pathways would not be 
sufficient to achieve fiscal sustainability. The SPD-led government had supported the 
Rürup Commission’s conclusion: it had suggested that, in the long run, the phasing out of 
the unemployment and partial pensions pathways, which was a key element of the 
Sustainability Act of 2004, could not serve as an alternative, but rather only as a 
complement to a retirement age increase (Bundesregierung 2003, 19). The gradual shift   11
of the reform agenda from tax increases and benefit cuts to changing eligibility 
conditions, including the normal retirement age, resulted from the convergence of new 
ideational and institutional constraints. Specifically, a new pension policy paradigm, 
which gradually emerged after the mid-1990s, constrained the options of governments by 
defining a contribution rate ceiling and a benefit floor. In addition, EU fiscal institutions 
restricted higher federal transfers financed from general revenues. 
 
The Reform Options in the 1990s 
 
In the mid-1990s, German governments could still choose from a relatively broad 
range of effective options for reform. They could address the cost pressures from 
population aging by increasing revenues, reducing benefits, and changing entitlement 
conditions. Unlike most earnings-related pension programs, which were financed only 
from wage-based contributions from employers and workers, the German pension 
program had a second source of revenue, transfers from federal tax revenues, which 
amounted to about a fifth of program expenditure. Even though the level of pension 
benefits in Germany was not as high as those in other countries with social insurance-
type pension systems, it was possible to decrease it substantially without creating much 
poverty among pensioners. Germany had more possibilities for changing eligibility 
conditions than most OECD countries. The entitlement conditions could be restricted not 
only by an increase of the normal retirement age, but also by an increase of the retirement 
ages for the many kinds of early retirement benefits such as unemployment pensions, 
special early retirement pensions, and disability pensions. The number of options for   12
using the pension program’s reserves were much more limited in Germany than in most 
OECD countries because the size of the reserve fund was insignificant. In the mid-1990s, 
its small cash reserves could cover only small and temporary deficits, but could not 
contribute to paying for the costs of population aging (Deutsche Rentenversicherung 
Bund 2007, 201). Because of ideational constraints, German governments considered 
only a subset of these options. Since the social insurance paradigm, which guided 
German pension policy-making from the 1950s to the mid-1990s (Ruland 1990; 
Nullmeier and Rüb 1993), defined income maintenance and retirement after a long 
history of employment as the most important pension policy goals, it ruled out both large 
benefit cuts and an increase of the normal retirement age. In order to maintain these 
goals, it allowed major tax increases (Bundesregierung 1989) and defined small benefit 
cuts and a shift of the costs of early retirement from the public pension program to 
privately financed ones as acceptable options (Bundesregierung 1997). 
 
The Paradigm Shift in Pension Policy 
 
In the late 1990s, the social insurance paradigm was gradually replaced by a new 
one: the multi-pillar paradigm (Hering 2004; Hinrichs 2005). The first phase in this 
process was the emergence of the idea that the pension contribution rate be kept stable in 
the long term. Since the late 1980s, governments had conducted several long-term 
projections of pension finances which showed that the rate would rise from close to 20 
percent in the 1990s to more than 25 percent in 2030 (Bundesregierung 1998a, 242). Both 
Christian Democratic and Social Democratic pension policy-makers found gradual   13
increases of the contribution rate acceptable because they sought to distribute the costs of 
population aging fairly between workers, pensioners, and the federal government 
(Bundesregierung 1989, 138). But in the mid-1990s, the CDU/CSU and SPD’s 
acceptance of contribution rate increases rapidly declined (Bundesregierung 1997, 1-2, 
1998b, 15); low economic growth and high unemployment led to large shortfalls of 
contribution revenues, which required an almost annual increase of the contribution rate. 
Concerned about the negative employment effects of high pension contributions, 
economic policy-makers and employer organizations called for an immediate and 
permanent reduction of the contribution rate (Louven and Kauder 1996; BDA 1998). 
Both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats defined the level of 20 percent, 
which had been exceeded for the first time in 1995, as the upper limit for the contribution 
rate. In order to reduce the rate and keep it below 20 percent in the face of persistent and 
growing cost pressures, they committed themselves to a large increase of revenues from 
general taxes, the pension program’s second source of financing, and to a significant 
reduction of pension spending. 
 
The new goal of stable contributions led to two massive increases of federal 
transfers to the public pension program in 1997 and 1998 (Bundesregierung 1997, 1-2, 
1998b, 15). Even though these measures allowed a reduction of the contribution rate in 
the short term, they did not stabilize it in the long term: projections showed that the rate 
would reach almost 24 percent by 2030 (Bundesregierung 1999a, 135). But after 1999, 
additional, large increases of transfers from general revenue were out of the question 
because the EU’s fiscal rules required member states to keep their general government   14
budget deficit below 3 percent of GDP and achieve a balanced budget in the medium 
term (Bundesregierung 1999c). Both the SPD and the CDU/CSU were committed to 
meeting these requirements (SPD 2005, 58; CDU/CSU 2005, 29-30). Since Germany’s 
deficit exceeded the 3-percent limit in the period from 2002 to 2005 (European 
Commission 2006), both the SPD-led government and the grand coalition government 
ruled out the option of transferring more general tax revenues to the public pension 
program. To reduce the budget deficit, they tried to cut the existing federal transfers 
(Bundesregierung 1999b, 164-165; CDU/CSU and SPD 2005, 80). Since these transfers 
accounted for more than 30 percent of the federal budget (Bundesministerium der 
Finanzen 2003, 61), they were an important component of a strategy for balancing the 
budget. 
 
Since the two refinancing options—the contribution rate increase and the general 
revenue increase—had been ruled out, German governments started accepting a 
substantial reduction of pension spending, including major benefit cuts. In 2001, the 
SPD-led government made a pension reform that cut benefits substantially and gradually 
transformed the social insurance system into a multi-pillar system (Bundesregierung 
2000, 1-2). Even though the Christian Democrats voted against this landmark reform, 
they informally agreed with the Social Democrats on the restructuring of the pension 
system (Hering 2008, 173-174). The most important feature of the Old-Age Provision 
Act of 2001 was the creation of a fixed ceiling for the pension contribution rate: 20 
percent up until 2020 and 22 percent in the period from 2020 to 2030. In addition, it 
created a quasi-automatic, action-forcing mechanism that was supposed to implement the   15
new contribution rate goals. If the 15-year projections of pension finances, which the 
government had to present to the parliament on an annual basis, showed that the 
contribution rate ceilings would be exceeded, the government was forced to propose 
effective solutions (Bundesregierung 2000, 408). This rule created a strong incentive for 
the government to propose effective pension reform measures before the annual pension 
report was published. If the government was successful in keeping the contribution rate 
within the defined limits, it could avoid a politically damaging debate about the fiscal 
sustainability of the public pension program. 
 
The Old-Age Provision Act defined and partly institutionalized the new multi-
pillar paradigm which was adopted both by the SPD and the CDU/CSU (CDU 2001, 78; 
SPD 2001, 83; Bundesregierung 2000, 35-37). Since this paradigm defined stable 
contributions and poverty prevention as the most important goals of pension policy, it 
precluded large increases of the contribution rate and reduced the constraints on benefit 
cuts. It accepted major benefit cuts unless they undermined the new goal of poverty 
prevention; the old constraint of income maintenance was no longer an important 
criterion. In order to keep the contribution rate stable and maintain poverty-preventing 
benefits, the paradigm permitted an increase of the normal retirement age and a closure of 
early retirement pathways (Bundesregierung 2003, 17-19). In 2004, the Social Democrats 
and Greens enacted a reform that operationalized and institutionalized the new goal of 
poverty prevention. Since the economic and projected demographic conditions had 
changed since 2001, the SPD-led government proposed additional, major benefit cuts as 
an effective measure to keep the contribution rate at a level below 20 percent up until   16
2020 and below 22 percent up until 2030 (Bundesregierung 2003). In order to prevent 
poverty among retirees, it also defined a minimum benefit level (for an average earner 
who paid contributions for 45 years) of 46 percent of gross wages up until 2020 and 43 
percent up until 2030. To ensure that these limits were respected, the government created 
another quasi-automatic, action-forcing mechanism: if the projected benefit level fell 
below the defined levels, the federal government was obliged to propose effective 
measures that would not conflict with the contribution rate ceiling (Deutscher Bundestag 
2004, 23). Even though the CDU/CSU was against the Sustainability Act of 2004 
(CDU/CSU 2004, 1-2), it supported the new floor for pension benefits (CDU/CSU 2006, 
2). In 2004, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats thus increasingly agreed 
on the settings of the key instruments: the contribution rate, the federal transfers, and the 




Building a Grand Coalition for a Higher Retirement Age 
 
The shift in the pension reform agenda from tax increases and benefit cuts to 
changes of the eligibility conditions was a necessary but insufficient condition for a 
formal agreement between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats regarding 
an increase of the retirement age. Even in the face of institutional and ideational 
constraints, the grand coalition government, which had come into office in 2005, was 
able to avoid a retirement age increase. Specifically, it had two possibilities. The first was   17
to change the instrument settings of the new pension policy paradigm: the grand coalition 
could have proposed either to increase the ceiling for the contribution rate or to reduce 
the minimum level for pension benefits. Between 1996 and 2004, the CDU/CSU and 
SPD had readjusted these instrument settings more than once. In the late 1990s, they 
accepted a long-term contribution rate of 24 percent and considered a benefit level of 64 
percent, relative to net wages, necessary for preventing poverty; in 2004, they accepted a 
maximum contribution rate of 22 percent, and a benefit level of 52 percent. The second 
possibility was to use other available options for changing eligibility conditions: the 
CDU/CSU and SPD could have continued the course of closing early retirement 
pathways and increased the actuarial deductions for an early receipt of pension benefits, 
which were very low compared to those in most other OECD countries (Werding 2007, 
20). These measures would have restricted and discouraged retirement before the age of 
65 and thus raised the effective retirement age without an increase of the normal one 
(Berkel and Börsch-Supan 2004, 21). 
 
Neither the CDU/CSU nor the SPD attempted to change the instrument settings of 
the new pension policy paradigm. In the 2005 federal election campaign, the Christian 
Democrats and the Social Democrats engaged in a coordinative discourse about pension 
reform in which both parties reaffirmed their commitment to keeping the pension 
contribution rate below the defined ceilings. The SPD claimed credit for having stabilized 
the contribution rate through pension reforms (SPD 2005, 7), and the CDU/CSU stated 
clearly that “in the long term, the pension contribution rate should not deviate from its 
current level” (CDU/CSU 2005, 28). Since the new risk of old-age poverty was not a key   18
issue on the political agenda, the parties’ commitment to poverty-preventing pensions 
was not as prominent in their election manifestos as that to stable contributions. Both the 
SPD and the CDU/CSU made vague promises that public pensions would remain the 
most important source of retirement income (SPD 2005, 53; CDU/CSU 2005, 28); in 
addition, the SPD also promised security in old age and opposed more cuts of public 
pension benefits (SPD 2005, 53). 
 
The Convergence of Pension Policy Preferences 
 
Neither the CDU/CSU nor the SPD regarded the closing of early retirement 
pathways as an alternative to raising the statutory retirement age. In addition, neither 
party considered the option of increasing the actuarial deductions for early retirement 
since there was a consensus among German pension experts that the existing deductions 
were fair (Werding 2007, 20; Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung 
2003, 86). In the 2005 federal election campaign, the Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats held similar views on changes of eligibility conditions: they found the closing 
of early retirement pathways insufficient and a retirement age increase necessary and 
unavoidable in the long term. The SPD made a clear commitment to the reversal of early 
retirement. For electoral reasons, it neither advocated nor ruled out an increase in the 
retirement age from 65 to 67 years. It stated that its goal was “to bring the effective 
retirement age closer to the statutory retirement age of 65 years” (SPD 2005, 53), but did 
not mention the option of increasing the normal retirement age. However, the SPD’s 
track record in office, especially the Sustainability Act of 2004, clearly showed that it   19
sought to consider this option in the near future. In addition, both Ulla Schmidt, the 
SPD’s labour minister, and Franz Thönnes, the SPD’s parliamentary state secretary in the 
Ministry of Labour, found a retirement increase necessary (Bundesrat 2004, 16; Mihm 
and Schwenn 2003). The CDU/CSU favored an age increase. To avoid an electoral 
backlash, it made only the following vague and conditional statement in the 2005 
elections: “[a] lengthening of work lives is necessary for stabilizing the public pension 
system in the long term. … A gradual increase of the retirement age becomes an option 
when the labor market conditions allow it” (CDU/CSU 2005, 28). The Christian 
Democrats did not refer explicitly to an increase of the statutory retirement age of 65 
years in their election manifesto, but they had clearly expressed their preference for this 
option in the resolution on Change and Fairness in Germany, which had been endorsed 
by the CDU’s party congress two years before the federal election (CDU 2003a, 41). This 
resolution called not only for a complete reversal of early retirement, but also for a 
gradual increase of the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 years. These measures had 
been recommended by the CDU’s Commission on Social Security Reform, named the 
Herzog Commission after its chairman, former federal president Roman Herzog (CDU 
2003b, 42). The Rürup Commission’s fiscal projections and analysis of reform options 
had convinced the Herzog Commission that raising the statutory retirement age by 2 
years was necessary (Personal Interview 2008e). 
 
The EU’s fiscal constraints, the adoption of the multi-pillar paradigm, and the 
convergence of pension policy preferences facilitated the building of a formal grand 
coalition on raising the retirement age. Shortly after the 2005 federal election, the   20
CDU/CSU and SPD were able to reach a written agreement on pension reform which 
included an increase of the retirement age from 65 to 67 years. Their coalition agreement 
formalized the cross-party consensus on the instrument settings and laid out a detailed 
plan for raising the retirement age (CDU/CSU and SPD 2005, 96-97). Since Germany 
was under pressure to comply with the EU’s budget deficit rules, the Christian Democrats 
and Social Democrats explicitly ruled out the possibility of increasing the federal transfer 
to the public pension program (CDU/CSU and SPD 2005, 80). Even though they decided 
to increase the pension contribution rate from 19.5 to 19.9 percent in response to short-
term budgetary problems, they agreed that the 20 percent ceiling would not be exceeded 
(CDU/CSU and SPD 2005, 28, 96). For the first time, both parties formally supported the 
new pension benefit level that had been defined in the Sustainability Act of 2004. In 
addition, they promised that there would be no nominal cuts of pension benefits 
(CDU/CSU and SPD 2005, 96). 
 
The Grand Coalition’s Agreement on Raising the Retirement Age 
 
In order to achieve the goals of stable contributions and poverty-preventing 
pensions within the EU’s fiscal constraints, they focused on the option of raising the 
retirement age. They stated in their coalition agreement that the reversal of early 
retirement was insufficient and “a gradual increase of the statutory retirement age over 
the long term necessary” (CDU/CSU and SPD 2005, 97). Specifically, they agreed that 
they would pass legislation in 2007 that would raise the retirement age from 65 to 67 
years, starting in 2012 and ending “at the latest” in 2035 (CDU/CSU and SPD 2005, 97).   21
To strengthen the acceptance of the retirement age increase and reduce the risk that the 
small parties, especially the Left Party, mobilize voters against the government, the 
CDU/CSU and SPD used many of the classic strategies of blame avoidance (Personal 
Interview 2008b, 2008c; Pal and Weaver 2003, 25-33): they exempted workers who had 
paid contributions for 45 years, compensated older workers at risk of unemployment 
through a set of active labor market measures (CDU/CSU and SPD 2005, 97), passed the 
reforms at the beginning of the legislative period, and delayed the implementation of 
changes until after the next election (Personal Interview 2008b, 2008e). In addition, the 
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats developed a successful “communicative 
discourse” (Schmidt 2002, 209-256) for persuading party members of the necessity of a 
higher statutory retirement age. Angela Merkel, the CDU’s leader and new German 
chancellor, told party delegates that the coalition government had chosen to increase the 
retirement age because it wanted to avoid nominal pension cuts (Merkel 2005, 4-5). 
Franz Müntefering, the SPD’s chairman and labor minister in the grand coalition 
government, provided a similar justification for the retirement age increase: at the SPD’s 
party congress, he described it as a tough decision that was necessary for avoiding further 
benefit cuts (Müntefering 2005, 6). The party congresses of the Christian Democrats and 
Social Democrats approved the coalition agreement almost unanimously and thus 
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Overcoming Opposition to the Retirement Age Increase 
 
The grand coalition for raising the retirement age, and the plan set out in the 
coalition agreement, shaped the decision-making process at the levels of the cabinet, of 
the coalition, and of the parliament: at each level, it helped to overcome resistance from 
opponents of the shift from 65 to 67 years. At the cabinet level, labor minister 
Müntefering made a controversial proposal to complete the transition much earlier than 
expected and argued that it was “in line with the coalition agreement” (Bovensiepen et al. 
2006). Despite much criticism from both Social Democratic and Christian Democratic 
policy-makers, who were upset that the reform would be fully implemented six years 
before the deadline given in the coalition agreement, Müntefering’s proposal was 
approved unanimously by the cabinet members, including by the CSU’s strongest critic, 
Horst Seehofer (Personal Interview 2008b). At the coalition level, a special bipartisan 
pension working group, which the grand coalition had set up to implement the key 
measures of its pension reform plan (CDU/CSU and SPD 2006), reached an agreement 
very quickly because the provisions set forth in the coalition agreement were seen as non-
negotiable (Personal Interview 2008a, 2008b). The members of this group even agreed on 
measures that were more radical than those in the coalition agreement: they proposed to 
raise not only the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 years, but also the earliest 
eligibility age from 62 to 63 years, the age of eligibility for tax-favored private pensions, 
both personal and occupational ones, from 60 to 62 years, and the normal and earliest 
retirement age for disability pensions by 2 years (CDU/CSU and SPD 2006). By 
proposing this comprehensive set of measures, the bipartisan working group sought to   23
achieve both a societal paradigm shift and a significant change of retirement practices in 
companies (Personal Interview 2008b). At the parliamentary level, there was only weak 
opposition from CDU/CSU and SPD members despite the reform’s unpopularity among 
constituents. The Labor and Social Affairs Committee did not recommend any changes to 
the reform bill (Deutscher Bundestag 2006). Almost all of the Christian Democratic and 
Social Democratic members of parliament approved it. Only 11 members of the SPD’s 
left wing, who represented less than 3 percent of the grand coalition’s votes, rejected the 
reform (Deutscher Bundestag 1998, 8688-8690); they were unable to defend the old 
pension policy paradigm and substantially alter the increase of the retirement age 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1998, 8755-8761). 
 
In Germany, the resistance of the trade unions was overcome not only because of 
the grand coalition, but also because of the effects of institutional and ideational 
constraints: by reducing the government’s reform options, the EU’s fiscal constraints and 
the new pension policy paradigm increased the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis the trade 
unions. The DGB, the German Trade Union Federation, opposed an increase of the 
retirement age, the only option which the grand coalition government had considered. 
The DGB would have accepted a higher contribution rate in order to keep the retirement 
age at 65 years, maintain the benefit level, and avoid funding shortfalls (DGB 2008). 
Since this option was considered neither by the Social Democrats nor by the Christian 
Democrats, there was no room for reaching a compromise. The government did not 
negotiate the terms of the retirement age increase because the contribution rate ceiling 
and the minimum benefit level were difficult to reach even with the retirement age   24
increase (Personal Interview 2008d, 2008b, 2008c). Thus, it was not willing to scale back 
or slow down the age increase from 65 to 67 years and not able to offer generous 
exemption or compensation measures. In addition, the DGB was not willing to accept the 
increase from 65 to 67 years even in return for generous exemption or compensation 
measures since its biggest member unions, the IG Metall and Verdi, fundamentally 
rejected a higher retirement age (Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 11-19, 80-84; Personal 
Interview 2008d). Inspite of the trade unions’ fundamental opposition, the government 
expected that the union members and leaders would gradually accept the retirement age 
increase after the decision had been made (SPIEGEL 2007). These expectations turned 
out to be correct. The trade unions’ attempt to organize massive, nationwide protests 
against the retirement age increase largely failed (Personal Interview 2008d; SZ 2007). 
After the reform had been passed by parliament, the trade unions were increasingly 
willing to discuss with the government small and inexpensive changes to the public 
pension system that would give unions and employer organizations more options for 
negotiating gradual and flexible transitions from work to retirement (IGBCE 2007; 
Personal Interview 2008b, 2008c, 2008d). The first collective agreements of this kind 




This article has argued that governments are able to raise the retirement age 
despite high electoral risks and strong political opposition, especially from trade unions, 
if they build a grand coalition. The formation of formal or informal coalitions for this   25
very unpopular reform is facilitated by the convergence of multiple reform constraints 
that limit the available options for responding to fiscal pressures: (1) institutional rules, 
especially fiscal ones, (2) the pension policy paradigm, and (3) the design features of 
public pension programs. In addition, the building of a cross-party coalition depends on a 
convergence of parties’ pension policy preferences: if the major parties develop similar 
views on the settings of key instruments, specifically on the level of taxes and pension 
benefits, and on the necessity of a higher retirement age, they are likely to come to an 
agreement on a retirement age reform. 
 
This article has shown that the shift in the German pension reform agenda 
between the mid-1990s to 2005 from tax increases and benefit cuts to retirement age 
increases can be explained by the convergence of institutional and ideational constraints. 
German governments ruled out the option of tax increases because of two constraints: the 
EU’s fiscal rules restricted the option of increasing transfers from the federal budget, and 
the multi-pillar paradigm put a limit on contribution rate increases and precluded 
additional cuts of pension benefits. Thus, German governments shifted their attention 
from taxes and benefits to the eligibility conditions, the only parameter of the public 
pension system that was largely unconstrained by the new fiscal rules and the new 
pension policy paradigm. The constraints on two of the key options for reforming the 
public pension system, tax increases and benefit cuts, were favorable conditions for the 
emergence of a grand coalition for a higher retirement age: they shifted the pension 
reform debate to the question of whether or not raising the retirement age was necessary 
for achieving a stable contribution rate and a poverty-preventing benefit level. If the two   26
major parties had still been able to use tax increases and benefit cuts as feasible 
alternatives, an agreement on increasing the retirement age would have been unlikely. 
 
This article has suggested that the politics of raising retirement ages differs from 
the politics of pension retrenchment and privatization in three respects. First, in order to 
increase the normal retirement age, governments need to define not only a “hard budget 
line” for pensions (Myles 2002), but also a hard benefit line. If both of these key 
instruments are constrained, the retirement age is the last resort for achieving fiscal 
sustainability. Second, gradual age increases are feasible even in mature pension systems; 
path dependence constrains retirement age increases much less than pension 
privatization. Third, the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis interest groups, especially trade 
unions, is higher in retirement age reforms than in pension retrenchment: if ideational and 
institutional constraints restrict key reform options and political parties build a grand 
coalition for a higher retirement age, a negotiated agreement with organized labor is not a 
requirement for a successful reform. These three features were present not only in 
Germany, but also in the United Kingdom and in the United States: governments found 
neither tax increases nor benefit cuts acceptable; path dependence did not prevent a 
significant age increase; and the trade unions were excluded from retirement age reforms 
which were initiated and adopted either by a formal grand coalition for a higher 
retirement age (in the United States) or by an informal one (in the United Kingdom). 
Thus, if the institutional or ideational constraints on pension reforms increase, the OECD 
and EU’s vision of raising the retirement age to more than 65 years will likely become a 
reality in other advanced industrialized countries.   27
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